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DESIGNING PLEA BARGAINING FROM THE GROUND UP:




American criminal procedure developed on the assumption that
grand juries and petit jury trials were the ultimate safeguards of fair
procedures and accurate outcomes. But now that plea bargaining has
all but supplanted juries, we need to think through what safeguards
our plea-bargaining system should be built around. This Symposium
Article sketches out principles for redesigning our plea-bargaining
system from the ground up around safeguards. Part I explores the
causes of factual, moral, and legal inaccuracies in guilty pleas. To
prevent and remedy these inaccuracies, it proposes a combination of
quasi-inquisitorial safeguards, more vigorous criminal defense, and
better normative evaluation of charges, pleas, and sentences. Part II
then diagnoses unfair repercussions caused by defendants’ lack of
information and understanding, laymen’s lack of voice, and the pub-
* Professor of Law and Criminology; Director, Supreme Court Clinic, University of
Pennsylvania Law School. Thanks to Jeff Bellin, Adam Gershowitz, and the William & Mary
Law Review for organizing this terrific Symposium.
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lic’s lack of information and participation. To prevent and fix these
sources of unfairness, it proposes ways to better inform pleas and to
make plea procedures more procedurally just.
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Because ours “is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of
trials,” it is insufficient simply to point to the guarantee of a fair trial
as a backstop that inoculates any errors in the pretrial process....
“[P]lea bargaining ... is not some adjunct to the criminal justice sys-
tem; it is the criminal justice system.”
—Justice Anthony Kennedy, Missouri v. Frye1
INTRODUCTION
American criminal justice is badly misshapen. Over the centuries,
Anglo-American jurists have constructed elaborate procedural safe-
guards around grand and petit juries.2 Juries, and especially jury
trials, were supposed to ensure fair process, accurate outcomes, and
checks on abuse of power.3 Thus, judges felt little pressure to super-
intend evidence gathering or assess each side’s stories before or at
trial.4 Our legal system put its faith in adversarial proceedings that
culminated in vigorously fought trials, at which the collision of truth
and error would ensure that factual, legal, and moral justice won
out.
While the shell of an adversarial system remains, the core has
been hollowed out. Plea bargaining began as a way for a few indis-
putably guilty defendants to resolve their cases quickly, saving
everyone the time and expense of getting to a foreordained conclu-
sion.5 But the exception has swallowed the rule. Today, roughly 94
percent of adjudicated felony defendants plead guilty; only about 4
percent enjoy jury trials, and the rest have bench trials.6 In mis-
demeanor cases, the disparity is even starker, with 99 percent or
1. 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (citation omitted) (first quoting Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.
Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012); then quoting Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as
Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)).
2. See STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, at xix (2012). See gener-
ally LAURA I. APPLEMAN, DEFENDING THE JURY: CRIME, COMMUNITY, AND THE CONSTITUTION
15-36 (2015).
3. Cf. BIBAS, supra note 2, at 13-14.
4. See infra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
5. Cf. BIBAS, supra note 2, at xviii.
6. SEAN ROSENMERKEL ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE
[DOJ], NCJ 226846, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2006—STATISTICAL TABLES 25
tbl.4.1 (2009), http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=2152 [https://perma.cc/765Y-3N
E6] (reporting 94 percent guilty pleas, 4 percent jury trials, and 2 percent bench trials in state
felony cases in 2006).
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more pleading guilty.7 Though petit juries are not quite extinct, they
are an endangered species. To use John Langbein’s example, petit
juries are about as representative of New York’s criminal courts as
the hippopotamus in the Bronx Zoo is representative of New York
City’s wildlife—curious, anomalous spectacles.8
This plea-bargaining system was not planned, but jury-rigged. It
grew up below the radar as a workaround that served all the insid-
ers’ interests.9 Because it was supposed to be exceptional, no one
bothered to build many safeguards into the process.10 The few safe-
guards that exist are largely designed to ensure the centrality of
jury trials. For example, at plea colloquies, judges typically dwell at
length on each of the many trial rights that a defendant is giving
up.11 They say much less about the likely penalties, may require
only a bare-bones allocution of factual and legal guilt, and do not
have to speculate about the odds of conviction or the collateral con-
sequences.12
Even as plea bargaining burgeoned, jury trials continued to mat-
ter for two important reasons. First, almost everyone trusted that
trials remained as safety valves whenever guilt was in real doubt.
The vast majority of defendants are factually and legally guilty, but
surely, we assumed, those who are innocent would persist to vindi-
cate their names at trial.13 But the recent wave of DNA exonerations
7. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS: 2010 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 242-45 tbl.D-4 (2010), http://www.uscourts.
gov/statistics-reports/judicial-business-2010 [https://perma.cc/NM9W-XW4T] (reporting that
of the 89,741 total defendants convicted and sentenced in federal criminal cases in fiscal year
2010, 97.4 percent (87,418) entered guilty pleas, 2.3 percent (2066) were convicted in jury
trials, and less than 0.3 percent (257) were convicted in bench trials).
8. John H. Langbein, On the Myth of Written Constitutions: The Disappearance of Crim-
inal Jury Trial, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119, 121 (1992).
9. See BIBAS, supra note 2, at xvii-xx.
10. See Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor
to Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1121-27 (2011).
11. The colloquy requirements in federal court are typical, dwelling mostly on the proce-
dural rights waived. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b); see also Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243
& n.5 (1969) (requiring that the record of a guilty-plea allocution reflect a defendant’s affirm-
ative waiver of his right to a jury trial, right to confront his accusers, and privilege against
self-incrimination).
12. See Bibas, supra note 10, at 1124; see also infra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
13. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 758 (1970) (“We would have serious doubts
about this case if the encouragement of guilty pleas by offers of leniency substantially in-
creased the likelihood that defendants, advised by competent counsel, would falsely condemn
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has revealed many guilty-plea convictions of defendants who are
factually innocent.14 Though perhaps hard to believe, innocent
people sometimes buckle under the overwhelming pressures and
incentives to plead guilty.15 If completely innocent people sometimes
plead guilty, there must be many more people with plausible fac-
tual, legal, or equitable defenses who are pleading too, as well as
those who may be guilty of lesser offenses or may merit lower
punishments.
Second, observers generally assumed that plea bargaining occur-
red in the shadow of trial. That is, they assumed that jury trials
exerted an outsized influence because plea bargaining both ration-
ally forecasted the probability of conviction and likely sentence and
resulted in deals proportionate to those rational expectations.16 But
my other scholarship has called into doubt both how representative
the universe of tried cases is and how rational the bargaining
process is. The lawyers’ incentives, the limits on discovery, the pres-
sures of pretrial detention, and the heuristics and biases that afflict
decision making all warp the bargaining process and outcomes.17
When the Supreme Court formally blessed plea bargaining four
decades ago, it did so on the key assumption that defense counsel
would vigorously vindicate innocent clients.18 But defense lawyers
are often shockingly overworked, shamefully underfunded, and
sometimes incompetent.19 They have little ability to mount inde-
pendent investigations and vigorous defenses, leaving the outcome
themselves. But our view is to the contrary.”).
14. As of this writing, The National Registry of Exonerations lists 274 exonerations in
cases in which the conviction was obtained by guilty plea. Browse Cases: Detailed View, NAT’L
REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/detaillist.as
px [https://perma.cc/6L9F-GXL6] (last visited Mar. 20, 2016) (filter “Tags” column with “P”
selection) (reporting that there have been 274 exonerations in cases in which the conviction
was obtained by a guilty plea); id. (filter “Tags” column with “P” selection; then filter “DNA”
column with “DNA” selection) (reporting that 42 of the 274 exonerations involved DNA).
15. See Roger Koppl & Meghan Sacks, The Criminal Justice System Creates Incentives for
False Convictions, 32 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 126 (2013).
16. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2463, 2465 & n.2 (2004) (discussing scholarly articles that also treat plea bargaining as
largely determined by rationally forecasting expected trial outcomes).
17. Id. at 2476-79, 2482, 2486, 2493-507, 2514, 2523.
18. See Brady, 397 U.S. at 758 (trusting that “adequate advice of counsel” would allay the
risk that innocent defendants “would falsely condemn themselves”).
19. See generally STEPHANOS BIBAS & BENJAMIN BARTON, REBOOTING JUSTICE (forth-
coming 2016) (manuscript at ch. 2) (on file with author).
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to ride on the quality of police work.20 Police, however, may jump to
conclusions, focus in on one suspect too quickly, and not thoroughly
investigate alibis and leads that might point to other culprits.21 
In addition, bad defense lawyering, coupled with mystifying pro-
cedures and strong pressures to plead quickly, can make it hard for
defendants to choose intelligently among the alternatives before
them and understand the likely convictions, sentences, and conse-
quences that would flow from each one.22 The trial will never come,
and even the plea colloquy may be too late. New safeguards need to
be built in earlier to ensure that the investigation, negotiation, and
consideration of pleas is done correctly up front.
Lamenting the death of jury trials is a bit like complaining about
the weather. A cottage industry criticizes their demise, but mere
mortals are incapable of resurrecting them from the dead. Instead,
it is time to design a plea-bargaining system from the ground up
and then put some of those ideas into practice. 
The core goals of a criminal procedural system should be accuracy
and fairness. The investigatory, bargaining, and advising processes
should be (re)designed to ensure the factual, legal, and moral ac-
curacy of the resulting convictions, sentences, and collateral conse-
quences. Fairness requires that defendants have the knowledge and
freedom needed to make intelligent choices among alternatives. It
also means that defendants, victims, and other participants must
have meaningful opportunities to be heard and that they receive
fair, respectful treatment along the way.
A system designed from scratch would rely little, if at all, on ad-
versarial trials that would probably never come, let alone on appeals
and collateral attacks that would come much too late and require
second-guessing low-visibility, off-the-record decisions. Instead, it
would build in some quasi-inquisitorial process early on, include
adversarial participation early enough to make a difference, and
incorporate several types of meaningful screening. It is far more
20. See id. (manuscript at 15-16, 18).
21. See DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS 22-
24 (2012) (discussing how police are affected by confirmation bias).
22. See Stephanos Bibas, The Supreme Court, 2011 Term—Comment: Incompetent Plea
Bargaining and Extrajudicial Reforms, 126 HARV. L. REV. 150, 150, 169-71 (2012) (explaining
that defense counsel abilities vary widely and that counsel should explain the advantages and
disadvantages of various plea bargains).
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important and effective to get things right the first time than to
spend years trying to reconstruct how things might have gone dif-
ferently.
The remainder of this Symposium Article comprises two parts.
Part I looks at how to design a more accurate plea-bargaining sys-
tem. Limited information, the psychology of investigations, and
constricted defense participation can make pleas factually inaccu-
rate. And now that grand juries are meaningless and plea judges are
largely passive, no system actor ensures that charges are equitable
and fitting. Solutions could include making the investigative process
more inquisitorial, giving defense lawyers greater roles and more
information earlier on, loosening bail rules, and ensuring more rig-
orous, neutral screening.
Part II turns to promoting plea bargaining’s fairness. Defendants
understand little of what they are getting into and have little op-
portunity to speak and be heard. The same is true of victims and
affected locals. Solutions ought to include providing better informa-
tion and de-biasing about odds and likely outcomes in advance of
pleas. Reforms could even include preparing presentence reports in
advance of pleas to serious crimes. Lay participants should have
greater opportunities to speak, and proceedings should be more pub-
lic and transparent to foster oversight and public scrutiny.
I. ENSURING FACTUALLY, LEGALLY, AND MORALLY ACCURATE
PLEAS
In recent years, the rise in DNA exonerations23 has painfully
exposed the shortcomings of criminal investigations and plea nego-
tiations. Section A explores the psychological, structural, and other
forces that hamper both those procedures and the weighing of the
equities of bringing charges. Section B goes on to suggest a range of
quasi-inquisitorial, adversarial, and other structural elements that
could make judgments more factually and legally accurate as well
as better tailored to each case’s equities.
23. See, e.g., supra note 14.
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A. Sources of Inaccuracy
1. Factual and Legal Inaccuracy
Our system is built as an adversarial one.24 Police measure their
performance based in part on how many arrests they make and how
many cases they close, and prosecutors count up convictions as
notches on their belts.25
That adversarial mindset skews the state’s development of its
cases. Once initial evidence, hunches, or tips incline an investiga-
tor toward a suspect, the confirmation bias colors police officers’
thoughts and investigations to reinforce their initial beliefs.26 Thus,
police jump to conclusions, develop tunnel vision, and fail to con-
sider alternative possibilities, or to take them seriously.27 Moreover,
police officers, forensic scientists, and prosecutors have conflicting
roles: on one hand, to determine objectively “whodunit,” and on
the other, to clear cases by arresting, charging, and convicting a
suspect. Motivated reasoning may thus skew their truth-seeking
findings toward their adversarial interests. The adversarial role,
membership in the law-enforcement team, and anger at outrageous
crime may further bias thinking.28 This adversarial mindset would
be more defensible if there were both an equal adversary on the
other side ferreting out evidence of innocence, and a neutral adju-
dicator weighing it all in the end. Neither assumption, however,
holds true anymore.
First, consider the feebleness of the adversarial process. Criminal
defendants are generally poor, so most must rely on court-appointed
counsel.29 Only a sliver of them, such as white-collar defendants,
can afford great lawyers and thorough investigations.30 Setting this
24. See BIBAS & BARTON, supra note 19 (manuscript at 14).
25. See generally Koppl & Sacks, supra note 15 (discussing how prosecutor and police
incentives to get convictions lead to convictions of the innocent).
26. See SIMON, supra note 21, at 23.
27. See id. at 24.
28. See id. at 25-29.
29. See CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DOJ, NCJ 179023,
SPECIAL REPORT: DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 1 (2000) (“At felony case termination,
court-appointed counsel represented 82% of State defendants in the 75 largest counties in
1996 and 66% of Federal defendants in 1998.”).
30. See id. at 3-4.
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minority aside, defense lawyers have too many cases, too little time,
too little pay, and too little support to investigate and advocate vig-
orously.31 Rarely can they afford private investigators or forensic
testing.32 And flat- or capped-fee arrangements push attorneys to-
ward supporting quick pleas.33 Plus, investigation and prosecution
are largely secret and opaque. Defense lawyers have little opportu-
nity to de-bias officers and prosecutors by presenting opposing
perspectives—the sort of information that jurors would have heard
at trial.34 In addition, criminal discovery is pretty weak and fre-
quently waived.35 In most jurisdictions, defendants have no right to
the state’s inculpatory evidence, impeachment evidence, or evidence
of affirmative defenses.36 It is even unclear whether defendants
have a right to classic Brady exculpatory evidence before they plead
guilty.37
The lack of a neutral adjudicator, of course, is precisely what plea
bargaining seeks to achieve in order to promote efficiency. The Sup-
reme Court assumes that by admitting guilt, a defendant obviates
further adjudication.38 But innocent defendants plead guilty, and
guilty-plea allocutions are too cursory to serve as much of a check.39
Often, a defendant admits guilt in the most general terms, and the
prosecution likewise refers vaguely to what witnesses and other evi-
dence would show at trial. Courts supposedly insist on more, a
“strong factual basis,” when a defendant enters an Alford plea—
that is, pleads guilty while maintaining his innocence.40 But despite
31. See BIBAS & BARTON, supra note 19 (manuscript at 14-15).
32. See, e.g., supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
33. BIBAS & BARTON, supra note 19 (manuscript at 16-18).
34. See id.
35. See id. (manuscript at 14-15) (describing what defense attorneys need to do to zeal-
ously defend their clients and how they lack the time to fulfill this role).
36. The federal approach is typical in denying access to witnesses’ names or statements
until trial. See Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) (2012) (barring compelled disclosure of govern-
ment witness statements “until said witness has testified on direct examination in the trial
of the case”); FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a) (specifying government’s discovery obligation upon defen-
dant’s request); United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629-33 (2002) (rejecting a constitutional
right to impeachment or affirmative-defense evidence in advance of a guilty plea).
37. For a discussion of the circuit split surrounding this issue, see Michael Nasser Pet-
egorsky, Note, Plea Bargaining in the Dark: The Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Brady Evidence
During Plea Bargaining, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3599, 3614-31 (2013).
38. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1970).
39. See supra note 11.
40. Alford, 400 U.S. at 38; see id. at 37-38.
2016] DESIGNING PLEA BARGAINING 1065
these limitations in Alford itself, some courts allow Alford pleas
even without any record evidence of guilt.41
Judges at plea colloquies are unaccustomed to verifying guilt and
feel unable to do so. Generally, they have no evidence in the record,
no access to discovery, and no sense of the victim, the defendant,
and the circumstances of the alleged crime.42 Judges thus defer to
prosecutors and defense lawyers.43 But with limited funding and
constrained bargaining power, defense lawyers are not much of a
counterweight.44 In essence, the only adjudicator is the prosecutor,
as Jerry Lynch memorably explained.45 But an adversarially
trained, adversarially minded prosecutor is a poor substitute for a
defense lawyer, whose job is to push back, or a judge, whose job is
to probe skeptically the weaknesses of each side’s case.
2. Normative Inaccuracy
Even when the police have arrested and prosecutors have charged
the right guy, they may be committing an injustice. In a series of
important works, Josh Bowers has explained how criminal justice
professionals tend to fixate on legal factors, like whether conduct
violates a statute, and administrative considerations, such as maxi-
mizing arrest or conviction statistics.46 They pay much less attention
to normative guilt—that is, the equities.47 Criminal statutes are
broad or even overbroad, so they often criminalize conduct that is
morally unobjectionable or borderline at best.48 Factually guilty
defendants thus often receive far more punishment than they really
deserve.
41. See United States v. Tunning, 69 F.3d 107, 111-12 (6th Cir. 1995); Higgason v. Clark,
984 F.2d 203, 207 (7th Cir. 1993); Jones v. State, 351 S.W.3d 784, 784 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011).
42. See Bibas, supra note 10, at 1142.
43. See id.
44. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
45. See Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2117, 2118-23 (1998) (exploring the inquisitorial role of the prosecutor in criminal pro-
ceedings).
46. See Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not
to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1656-58 (2010).
47. Id.
48. See generally id.; Josh Bowers, The Normative Case for Normative Grand Juries, 47
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 319 (2012) [hereinafter Bowers, The Normative Case].
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The historical safeguards for such blameless conduct have fallen
away, one by one. The narrowness of common law crimes has erod-
ed, as legislatures rush to enact new or broaden existing crimes,
claim political credit, and give prosecutors new tools.49 Police dis-
cretion not to arrest is weakened by incentives to boost arrest
statistics.50 Likewise, prosecutorial discretion—the choice not to
charge—is weakened by similar incentives to rack up conviction
statistics and by fixation on legal and administrative guilt.51 Grand
juries are dominated by prosecutors or bypassed entirely, and petit
juries rarely enter the picture.52 The broader trend at work, I have
argued, is the professionalization of criminal justice, resulting in a
mechanical, assembly-line approach to processing cases.53 To speed
up the assembly line, we have squeezed out individualized weigh-
ing of desert, remorse, reform, and similar particularistic moral
values.54
B. Promoting Accuracy Early On
One response to the problems of inaccuracy would be to import a
European-style inquisitorial system. Many elements of inquisitor-
ialism are indeed attractive. But the comparative law literature on
legal transplants should breed skepticism about our ability to trans-
plant a very different system of justice wholesale.55 The soil of the
American legal system is deeply adversarial.56 America lacks the
rigorously neutral training and career tracks for judges, investigat-
ing magistrates, and the like that would be needed for such a
system to succeed, and filling these gaps from scratch would be
49. See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 55-59 (1997).
50. See Koppl & Sacks, supra note 15, at 126 (discussing how police incentives to get
convictions lead to convictions of the innocent).
51. See id.
52. See Kevin K. Washburn, Restoring the Grand Jury, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2333, 2352-53
(2008) (asserting that although the grand jury was intended to provide a check on the prose-
cutor, the prosecutor dominates these proceedings).
53. See BIBAS, supra note 2, at 15-26, 33, 38-40.
54. See id.
55. See generally Máximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The
Globalization of Plea Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45
HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (2004) (cautioning against “Americanization” of foreign legal systems).
56. See BIBAS & BARTON, supra note 19 (manuscript at 14).
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difficult.57 Moreover, doing so would be somewhat at odds with the
desire for normative accuracy, which calls for greater lay roles and
political accountability.
Inquisitorialism can nevertheless play a part, so long as it is
blended with other, more indigenous institutions, such as more
robust roles for defense counsel. Requiring more neutral screens,
second looks, and greater cooperation can do more to turn the
current game of hiding the ball into a more collaborative discussion
and shared search for truth.
1. Inquisitorial Measures 
To make plea bargaining more accurate, the system needs actors
who are not hired, rewarded, or promoted for racking up convictions
to be more actively involved. This goal requires developing inde-
pendent departments or bodies outside the core institutions of police
departments and prosecutors’ offices, new bodies whose missions are
not tied to arrests and convictions.
Foremost among the new independent bodies would be investigat-
ing magistrates. A judicial official, such as a magistrate, would take
an active role in investigating, following up leads, sharing discovery,
and framing the issues for potential adjudication. With the advent
of FaceTime, Skype, and similar electronic communications, magis-
trates can interview many possible witnesses and review documents
and records without leaving their chambers. The parties could sug-
gest various witnesses, pieces of evidence, and lines of inquiry, and
the magistrate could dig into and test each one. This alternative
would pool efforts, greatly compensating for defense lawyers’ limited
time and attention to pursuing leads and alibis. It would also limit
each side’s ability to hide unfavorable evidence or spin a witness’s
story, as the magistrate would record the fruits of the investigation
for the use of both sides.
Investigating magistrates could also take prompt depositions of
victims, witnesses, and even the many defendants who waive their
Miranda rights. After all, the defendant is generally the person who
57. See Langer, supra note 55, at 11-13 (discussing how legal education and socialization
within a particular legal system shapes views on various structural understandings such as
the role of judges or how plea bargaining should proceed).
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knows the most about the case. At the stationhouse, soon after ar-
rest, an on-call magistrate could question the suspect. Statements
would be audio- and video-recorded. Investigators would draw nat-
ural inferences from silence, or pin down a suspect’s alibi and check
it out promptly. Magistrate questioning would improve upon police
questioning, which on occasion lets slip incriminating details and
results in some false confessions.58 The magistrate’s involvement
would be analogous to a double-blind experimental design; the mag-
istrate is less likely to bias the outcome because he is not motivated
to tally arrests and does not know the secret details of the crime.59
Police departments and prosecutors’ offices could also appoint
designated devil’s advocates for moderately serious cases. The advo-
cate’s job would be to argue the weaknesses in each case, so police
and prosecutors should carefully consider the other side. Psychology
studies find that forcing a decision maker to “consider the opposite”
is perhaps the best way to combat various psychological heuristics
and biases.60 It is hard to know how effective these advocates would
be, however, at swimming upstream against the dominant culture
within each office, just as internal affairs divisions have difficulty
pushing back against internal misconduct.61
Prosecutors could also borrow from the playbook of former New
Orleans District Attorney Harry Connick, Sr. They could institute
hard-screening units, staffed by experienced trial attorneys, to
58. See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REV.
1051, 1054 (2010) (“We often cannot tell what happened [in a false confession] from reading
the written records. In many cases, however, police likely disclosed those details during
interrogations by telling exonerees how the crime happened. Police may not have done so
intentionally or recklessly; the study materials do not provide definitive information about
the state of mind of the officers.”); see also Koppl & Sacks, supra note 15 (discussing prose-
cutor and police incentives to get convictions).
59. Cf. Akhil Reed Amar & Renée B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-
Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857, 898-900 (1995) (proposing a system of station-
house depositions). Amar and Lettow would radically revise existing self-incrimination
doctrine to make such depositions admissible. See id. at 898-901. For present purposes, I do
not need to go so far or disturb existing doctrine. The large majority of defendants already
waive their Miranda rights and choose to speak with police. See Richard A. Leo, Inside the
Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266, 275-76 (1996). Such defendants would
be the ones covered by my proposal.
60. See Bibas, supra note 16, at 2523; see also id. at 2523-25.
61. See Al Baker & Jo Craven McGinty, N.Y.P.D. Confidential, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/28/nyregion/28iab.html?pagewanted=all [https://
perma.cc/7LVM-XXMV].
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speak with the witnesses and probe the weaknesses of each case
before committing to charge and prosecute it.62 Insisting on more
evidence up front, before the office has committed itself to prosecute,
delays the onset of tunnel vision and the confirmation bias, which
leads prosecutors to interpret most of the evidence as supporting the
initial charging decision.63 Stricter screening also leads prosecutors
to decline about half of the charges received, reserving prosecution
for the strongest cases—those in which defendants are least likely
to be innocent.64
Supervisory prosecutors could also create formal avenues for de-
fense lawyers to make legal and normative arguments on behalf of
their clients, much as well-connected ex-prosecutors already do
informally.65 As Jerry Lynch explains, allowing appeals of prosecu-
tors’ charging and plea-bargaining decisions can force them to justi-
fy their offers and weigh countervailing considerations ex ante.66
Judges can also be more active before and at plea colloquies. Al
Alschuler and I have previously proposed relaxing the stringent ju-
dicial ban on all participation in plea discussions to allow judges to
counterbalance prosecutors’ unilateral offers and threats.67 Being
more active need not mean sacrificing neutrality.68 If a defendant
chose to reject a judge’s advice to plead, the case could automatically
be reassigned to a different judge for trial.69 The late Bill Stuntz
proposed requiring judges at plea colloquies to review guilty pleas’
factual bases very carefully, with little deference.70 Military courts
already do this by reversing pleas whenever they are improvident.71
Relatedly, I have supported banning Alford and nolo contendere
62. Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV.
29, 61-65, 71 fig.1 (2002).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See Lynch, supra note 45, at 2148-49.
66. Id. at 2125-29, 2148-49.
67. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Trial Judge’s Role in Plea Bargaining, Part I, 76 COLUM.
L. REV. 1059, 1059-60 (1976); Bibas, supra note 16, at 2542-43; Bibas, supra note 22, at 168
& n.123.
68. See Bibas, supra note 22, at 168.
69. Id. at 168 & n.123; Bibas, supra note 16, at 2542-43.
70. WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 302-03 (2011).
71. Id.
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pleas to ensure that the judge has unequivocally verified the defen-
dant’s guilt.72
Forensic and scientific experts can also be more inquisitorial.
Crime labs can be moved out of police departments to become inde-
pendent agencies or offices within the judiciary.73 Courts can make
greater use of their existing authority to appoint neutral experts,
beholden to neither side, to test ballistics, drugs, biological evidence,
mental illness, and other forensic issues.74
2. More Vigorous Defense
One of the best solutions to the problem of inadequate defense
would be to greatly increase defender funding and greatly reduce
caseloads.75 This has long proven politically infeasible, however, so
for the moment, I set it aside.76
More modestly, defenders could at least receive dedicated funding
for private investigators and forensic testing. Given the popularity
of crime dramas such as CSI,77 forensic funding is less politically
vulnerable to the charge that it gets guilty defendants off the hook,
because the results seem more neutral and scientific.78 Thus, it
might well be more politically palatable than an overall funding in-
crease.79
Also, police and prosecutors should greatly expand their informa-
tion sharing with defense lawyers early on, disclosing not only ex-
culpatory material (required by Brady and Giglio),80 but also most
72. See BIBAS, supra note 2, at 160.
73. See Craig M. Cooley, Reforming the Forensic Science Community to Avert the Ultimate
Injustice, 15 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 381, 422-23 (2004).
74. See id.; see, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 706.
75. See Bibas, supra note 16, at 2476, 2479-80.
76. See Bibas, supra note 22, at 167.
77. See Sheila L. Stephens, The “CSI Effect” on Real Crime Labs, 41 NEW ENG. L. REV.
591, 591-93 (2007) (discussing how the popularity of the television show CSI is affecting the
criminal justice system).
78. See Cooley, supra note 73, at 417-21.
79. See id.
80. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742
(1970); see also Ben Grunwald, An Empirical Study of Criminal Discovery: The Effects of Open
File 9-12 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (discussing decisions in Giglio and
Brady).
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of the inculpatory material.81 This change would result in something
much closer to an open-file discovery system in advance of plea
bargaining, except that there would be safeguards against witness
tampering.82 For instance, in organized crime, gang, and drug cases,
witnesses’ names and addresses might not be disclosed at all, or
their statements might be shown to defense counsel under strict
protective orders against sharing those names with their clients.83
Witness statements might also be locked in through videotaped
depositions subject to cross-examination, so the statements would
be admissible regardless, and there would be no incentive to tamper
later.84
Bail reform would help defendants to consult with and assist
their defense lawyers in investigating their cases. Greater use of
ankle bracelets and GPS monitoring would relieve pressure to plead
guilty, while freeing up defendants to serve as their own private in-
vestigators, locating alibi and other favorable witnesses.85 Moreover,
many innocent defendants probably plead guilty to misdemeanors
in exchange for time served so they can just go home.86 Bail reform
that reduces or eliminates monetary bail for minor crimes would
lessen instances of the most common wrongful convictions.87
3. Better Normative Evaluation
Finally, we could create or resurrect various structures for ensur-
ing some focus on normative issues—whether a defendant deserves
punishment, and if so, how much.88 I have suggested letting citi-
zen representatives rotate through police and prosecutors’ offices.89
81. See Grunwald, supra note 80 (manuscript at 19).
82. In Texas, the Michael Morton Act, which amended the Texas Code of Criminal Proce-
dure, now guarantees defendants access to witnesses’ names, addresses, and prior written or
recorded statements, including police reports and the like, as well as other relevant docu-
ments and tangible objects, before any trial or guilty plea. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 39.14 (West 2015). Prosecutors must also disclose all exculpatory and impeachment evi-
dence, regardless of how material it is. See id. These rights appear to be nonwaivable. See id.
83. See Grunwald, supra note 80 (manuscript at 13, 27-28, 30).
84. See SIMON, supra note 21, at 47-48.
85. See Bibas, supra note 16, at 2540.
86. See id. at 2491-93.
87. See id.
88. See Bowers, The Normative Case, supra note 48, at 349.
89. See BIBAS, supra note 2, at 148.
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Normative grand juries, plea juries, or restorative sentencing juries
could inject lay community voices into serious cases, ensuring that
charges and punishments do not deviate too far from the commu-
nity’s shared sense of justice.90 Whatever the institution, the goal is
some check to force a fresh, critical look without the legal blinders
that often push cases toward foreordained convictions and punish-
ments.
II. FAIRNESS: IMPROVING UNDERSTANDING, TRANSPARENCY, AND
PARTICIPATION
For too long, the institution of plea bargaining has relied uncrit-
ically on analogies to the free market and contract law.91 But poorly
informed, poorly educated, and poorly represented defendants are
far from the fully informed, rational actors of classical economic the-
ory.92 Moreover, bargaining is not just an economic transaction
meant to maximize deterrence and minimize transaction costs; it is
a political and moral drama that must do more to inform and in-
clude defendants, victims, and the public.93
A. Sources of Unfairness
1. Defendants’ Lack of Information
Defendants who consider pleading guilty are often poorly in-
formed. To bargain intelligently, they must first estimate the
strength of the prosecution’s case to forecast the likelihood of con-
viction and sentence.94 Civil litigants enjoy broad pretrial discovery,
so they have a pretty clear idea of the strength of each side’s
90. See APPLEMAN, supra note 2, at 132-58; BIBAS, supra note 2, at 148, 156-64; Stephanos
Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology into Criminal Procedure,
114 YALE L.J. 85, 144 (2004); see also Bowers, The Normative Case, supra note 48; Washburn,
supra note 52, at 2378-88.
91. See generally Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101
YALE L.J. 1909 (1992).
92. See Bibas, supra note 16, at 2467-68, 2494-97.
93. See Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 90, at 112-13.
94. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 91, at 1959.
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evidence.95 Witness depositions, interrogatories, and document
discovery all focus the issues and narrow areas of disagreement.96
“Many criminal defendants have an advantage over ... civil [liti-
gants],” as guilty defendants usually know their own guilt and have
some awareness of the likely evidence for and against them.97 Thus,
they have a reasonable idea of the likelihood of conviction and
expected punishment.98 But innocent or mentally ill defendants, or
those who were intoxicated during the crime, often know little about
the prosecution’s case.99
As mentioned above, discovery in criminal cases does little to pre-
view the other side’s position.100 In most states, the parties cannot
depose witnesses.101 In many states, the parties do not even learn
witnesses’ names and addresses, let alone their prior statements,
until trial or the eve of trial.102 In discovery, criminal “[d]efendants
receive only their own statements and criminal records, documents
and tangible objects, reports of examinations and tests, and expert
witness reports gathered by the prosecution.”103 As already men-
tioned, defendants have no right to examine evidence bearing on
impeachment or affirmative defenses in time for plea bargaining,
and it is not clear whether they have a right to classic exculpatory
material.104
Defense lawyers can do little to mitigate these problems. They
lack the state’s powers to issue search warrants and subpoenas,
force possible witnesses to testify before a grand jury, and offer
cooperation agreements or immunity.105 They usually lack the
resources to conduct thorough investigations, hire forensic ex-
perts, and run scientific tests.106 They may also lack the time, as
95. See Bibas, supra note 16, at 2493.
96. See id. at 2493-94.
97. Id. at 2494.
98. See id.
99. Id.
100. See BIBAS, supra note 2, at 63; see also supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
101. See Bibas, supra note 16, at 2493-94.
102. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2012); FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2.
103. Bibas, supra note 16, at 2494; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a).
104. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text; see also Bibas, supra note 16, at 2494
& n.125.
105. See Lynch, supra note 45, at 2125.
106. See BIBAS & BARTON, supra note 19 (manuscript at 16); Grunwald, supra note 80
(manuscript at 35).
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prosecutors sometimes make exploding offers that require pleading
before there is time to investigate.107 And when defense investiga-
tors do find and contact the prosecution’s witnesses, they may not
be able to persuade the witnesses to talk, even if those same
witnesses are willing—or feel pressure—to talk to the police.108
As a result, defendants bargain blindfolded. Prosecutors can bluff
or take advantage of defendants’ fears.109 They can even threaten
the death penalty in murder cases simply as leverage to induce
pleas.110 These problems are particularly acute when defendants are
innocent or risk averse, and when they are under indeterminate or
unstructured sentencing systems, which make outcomes less pre-
dictable.111
2. Defendants’ Lack of Understanding
Not only are defendants often in the dark about the evidence for
and against them, but they also have difficulty understanding and
evaluating plea deals and the likely consequences.112 Plea colloquies
are built around the trial rights that defendants are giving up,
such as cross-examination, trial by jury, proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, and the privilege against self-incrimination.113 Rules of crim-
inal procedure require judges to provide defendants with a laundry
list of procedural rights at plea colloquies, resulting in a near-
monologue interrupted only by the defendant’s perfunctory “Yes” to
each question.114 This information comes too late in the process to
make a difference; by the time of the plea colloquy, the plea is a fait
accompli.115 Moreover, defendants are probably overloaded with
107. See Bibas, supra note 22, at 153.
108. See Josh Bowers & Paul H. Robinson, Perceptions of Fairness and Justice: The Shared
Aims and Occasional Conflicts of Legitimacy and Moral Credibility, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
211, 213-17 (2012) (discussing public perceptions of criminal justice and the seeming necessity
to cooperate with police and prosecutors).
109. See Bibas, supra note 16, at 2495.
110. See MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES: CASES, STATUTES,
AND EXECUTIVE MATERIALS 1150 (5th ed. 2015).
111. See Bibas, supra note 16, at 2495.
112. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
113. See, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969).
114. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b).
115. See Lynch, supra note 45, at 2122-23.
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information during a plea colloquy. Humans are notoriously bad at
digesting information that they hear once without seeing, and the
problem must be even worse for laymen hearing technical legalese
in a stressful situation.116 As Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl Schneider
have noted, excessive mandated disclosures can boomerang, as ev-
eryone just tunes out the fine print.117
Having just endured this laundry list of procedural irrelevancies,
defendants have difficulty understanding and focusing on the sub-
stantive merits of the deal.118 In most jurisdictions, judges may not
take part in plea bargaining, and typically they do not forecast
expected sentences.119 They are supposed to rattle off the elements
of the crimes, but defendants may find it hard to understand tech-
nical doctrines (such as mens rea and accomplice liability) and eval-
uate the proof needed for each one.120 Defendants also do not know
the typical bargains and sentences for their crimes.121 And usually
the colloquy does not cover so-called collateral consequences because
they are nominally civil, such as deportation, sex-offender registra-
tion, or restrictions on residency or employment.122 Under Padilla
v. Kentucky, defense lawyers are supposed to advise their clients
about deportability ahead of time,123 but there is little safeguard to
ensure that they have done so adequately or at all.
At bottom, what defendants really need is an informed forecast of
the expected conviction and sentence (including collateral conse-
quences), how they compare to those received by other defendants,
and the risks and benefits of holding out or walking away.124
Defense lawyers try to communicate their best estimates to their
clients, but they may not be able to do much investigation and
discovery, may not have enough time to counsel their clients and
weigh options, and may even “meet ‘em and plead ‘em” at the initial
116. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159
U. PA. L. REV. 647, 716-19 (2011).
117. See id. at 720-22, 737-38.
118. See id. at 720-22, 725-27.
119. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1) (forbidding judges to participate); MILLER & WRIGHT,
supra note 110, at 1156.
120. See MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 110, at 1141-42.
121. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 91, at 1959.
122. See MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 110, at 1142-43.
123. See 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010).
124. See Bibas, supra note 22, at 165-67.
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appearance.125 They may be consciously or unconsciously biased by
their workloads and incentives to close cases.126 They may also
sometimes find it difficult to build mutual trust and get their clients
to understand the pros and cons of various options.127
3. Laymen’s Lack of Voice
Laymen—defendants, victims, and locals affected by a crime—
want their day in court. They may wish to accuse, deny, justify,
excuse, vent, express sorrow, apologize, or forgive.128 Crime wounds
relationships among people, and speaking about crime is often an
essential component of exposing and mending those frayed relation-
ships.129 Just as medical patients want doctors and nurses to listen
to their symptoms and maladies, so too do those affected by crimes
want their chance to be heard. They may expect a jury trial to give
them that opportunity, only to learn that a plea bargain has already
swept their case under the rug.130 That sense of a stake in and
ownership of a case often gets lost in legal discourse, as criminal
justice professionals focus on the bottom-line likelihood of conviction
and expected sentence.131 But as Tom Tyler’s work shows, giving
participants voice is an important part of procedural justice—of
treating participants fairly, respectfully, and with dignity.132 
Unfortunately, the plea-bargaining system has terrible bedside
manner. It focuses on the bottom line, to the exclusion of how it gets
there.133 Plea bargaining rushes cases along, foreclosing the oppor-
tunities to speak that laymen so desire.134 It measures efficiency in
days and dollars, not self-expression or reconciliation.135 Thus, it has
made far too little room for the parties even to encounter one
125. See BIBAS & BARTON, supra note 19 (manuscript at 20). 
126. See id. (manuscript at ch. 2).
127. See Bibas, supra note 16, at 2476-82, 2525-27.
128. BIBAS, supra note 2, at 159.
129. See Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 90, at 109-18. 
130. See id. at 136.
131. See Lynch, supra note 45, at 2140.
132. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 126-30 (2006).
133. See Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 90, at 88.
134. See id.
135. See BIBAS, supra note 2, at 65.
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another, let alone to engage in dialogue.136 Defense lawyers tell their
clients to stay quiet and script their plea allocutions, suppressing
their voices.137 Likewise, prosecutors displace victims and often fail
to enforce victims’ remaining rights to be heard.138
4. Opaque, Insular Criminal Justice
Relatedly, plea bargaining has turned criminal justice from
“educational social theater”139 into an impersonal, lawyer-driven
machine.140 In the colonial era, victims, defendants, and community
residents not only saw justice done but took part in doing it them-
selves.141 Jury trials were public and transparent, letting everyone
see that justice was done.142 They were also participatory, letting
everyone take turns in doing justice themselves.143 That partici-
pation empowered victims, defendants, and jurors.144 Jurors, in
particular, engaged in self-government, checked abuses of govern-
mental power, publicized crime problems, and underscored the
community’s moral judgment.145
Today, by contrast, plea bargaining is a remarkably insular,
impenetrable system.146 Backroom deals and corridor conversations
determine defendants’ fates, largely predestining the outcomes of
courtroom proceedings.147 Defendants receive take-it-or-leave-it
deals, often with short deadlines, and they usually take them.148 If
victims have any say at all, it is a purely ceremonial role at sentenc-
ing after the parties have already prescribed the outcome.149 Judges
act largely as figureheads, and community members play no active
136. See Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 90, at 96-101.
137. See BIBAS, supra note 2, at 16-17, 56-57.
138. See id. at 16-17, 90.
139. Id. at xv.
140. See Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 90, at 88-89.
141. See Washburn, supra note 52, at 2342-45 (discussing the history of the grand jury in
colonial America and its checks against British rule).
142. See APPLEMAN, supra note 2, at 28-29.
143. See id. at 15.
144. See id.
145. See Washburn, supra note 52, at 2342-45.
146. See Wright & Miller, supra note 62, at 34.
147. See Lynch, supra note 45, at 2122-23.
148. See id. at 2132.
149. See Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 90, at 99-100.
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role.150 As a result, defendants and victims may feel bewildered, as
if they have either gotten away with something or been taken ad-
vantage of.151 The public misunderstands and mistrusts the system,
thinking defendants are (sometimes literally) getting away with
murder.152
Our plea-bargaining system focuses on efficiency and therefore
cuts corners, relying on expedients that may cost legitimacy.153 For
instance, charge bargains seem to lie about the crime actually
committed.154 Alford and no-contest pleas do so doubly and may
seem to have convicted innocent defendants.155 Excessive use of
cooperation deals may breed resentment, as evidenced by the “Stop
Snitching” movement.156 As studies by Tom Tyler, Josh Bowers, and
Paul Robinson show, sacrificing legitimacy may come at a high cost,
undermining the law’s moral authority and the people’s willingness
to comply with it.157
B. Reforms/Solutions
Plea bargaining functions simultaneously as a private market
and as public justice, so improvements should address both its
private and public fairness.158 Improving the market’s fairness re-
quires ensuring that defendants receive and have the opportunity
to digest better information about the merits of their deals and
the likely alternatives to negotiated outcomes.159 Improving justice
means giving defendants, victims, and neighbors a day in court and
helping them to reconcile, as well as to understand and influence,
150. See APPLEMAN, supra note 2, at 137-39.
151. See Wright & Miller, supra note 62, at 33.
152. See ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING: CRIMINAL INFORMANTS AND THE EROSION OF
AMERICAN JUSTICE 115 (2009).
153. See BIBAS, supra note 2, at 64-65.
154. See id. at 45, 145; Wright & Miller, supra note 62, at 111-13.
155. See BIBAS, supra note 2, at 64-65, 70.
156. See NATAPOFF, supra note 152, at 114-26; Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Defendants:
The Costs and Benefits of Purchasing Information from Scoundrels, 8 FED. SENT’G REP. 292,
292-93 (1996).
157. E.g., TYLER, supra note 132, at 125-34; Bowers & Robinson, supra note 108; Paul H.
Robinson et al., The Disutility of Injustice, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1940 (2010).
158. See BIBAS, supra note 2, at 64.
159. See Bibas, supra note 22, at 165-67.
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the process.160 That also means fighting the most hidden, insular,
and dishonest kinds of plea bargains.
1. Better-Informed Pleas 
Defendants need better information about the facts and the
strength of the evidence against them.161 The most obvious remedy
is to liberalize both the amount and the timing of discovery, as dis-
cussed above.162 Discovery must be ample and occur well in advance
of a plea hearing.163
Defendants also need a sense of the best alternative to taking the
deal before them.164 Is there a mutually beneficial alternative, such
as a cooperation deal? Does the deal trigger or avoid various col-
lateral consequences, such as deportation? What are the dangers of
cooperating and, conversely, the downsides if the defendant is not
fully cooperative? Would holding out likely yield a better or worse
deal? What are the odds of acquittal at trial and if convicted, what
is the expected post-trial sentence?
In order to provide this information more effectively, defense
counsel need better training, mentoring, and information sharing
(and sometimes language skills, for clients who speak little En-
glish).165 Judges and prosecutors can also help to ensure that
defense counsel have communicated thoroughly.166 In particular,
prosecutors can use reverse proffer sessions to explain to defendants
the strength of the evidence, the likelihood of conviction, the ex-
pected post-trial sentence, and the benefits of a deal.167
Lawyers can also do more to present this information effectively
to defendants, who may be innumerate, illiterate, or speak little or
no English.168 All plea bargains should be in writing, ideally in plain
English, with simple charts to explain any changes in charges and
160. See Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 90, at 112-13.
161. See Grunwald, supra note 80 (manuscript at 37-38).
162. See id. (manuscript at 39-40); see also supra Part II.A.1.
163. See Grunwald, supra note 80 (manuscript at 39-40, 43).
164. See id. (manuscript at 37-38).
165. See Bibas, supra note 22, at 167.
166. See id. at 169-71.
167. See id. at 167-68.
168. See id. at 167.
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minimum, maximum, and expected sentences.169 These charts
should factor in probation, parole, and good-time credits, disclosing
what portion of the sentence must be served—and what fraction
typically is served—before a defendant is released.170 Lawyers must
translate technical descriptions of crimes into plain English so
defendants understand the requirements for conspiracy or accom-
plice liability, for example.171 Translations should be readily
available for non-English speakers.
2. Procedural Justice
Fairness is also a matter of how the plea process treats defen-
dants and other participants. Defendants should have opportunities
to meet with their lawyers in person, or at least by videoconference,
several times before pleading to build trust, discuss the facts, and
evaluate plea offers.172 That means abolishing “meet ‘em and plead
‘em” lawyering173 except for the most minor misdemeanors. Defen-
dants—and perhaps victims and neighbors—should receive plenty
of advance notice of plea offers and court dates.174 Defendants
should have opportunities to allocute at plea hearings and at sen-
tencing.175 Defendants and victims should also have opportunities
to meet and reconcile with one another, through victim-offender
mediation or similar restorative justice conferences.176
The criminal justice system should likewise favor the most open
and transparent forms of plea bargaining. The best pleas are ones
that do not lie about or manipulate the charges or facts.177 These
include blind or open pleas, in which defendants plead guilty to the
indictment, anticipating a sentence discount that is fixed or based
169. See id.
170. See id. at 165-66.
171. See id. at 167.
172. See Bibas, supra note 16, at 2540 (describing how pretrial detention can prevent defen-
dants from meeting with their lawyers, which makes them less able to evaluate plea offers
and thus more willing to take those offers).
173. BIBAS & BARTON, supra note 19 (manuscript at 20).
174. See Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 90, at 136 (discussing how victims and com-
munity members receive little notice of plea offers and convictions).
175. See APPLEMAN, supra note 2, at 149-58 (discussing the merits of allocution).
176. See Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 90, at 130-34.
177. See BIBAS, supra note 2, at 145.
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on an established judicial expectation.178 At the other end of the
spectrum are fact bargains, which lie about what happened, as well
as Alford and no-contest pleas, which equivocate about defendants’
guilt.179 More generally, charge bargains obscure what really hap-
pened and mute the system’s unequivocal finding of guilt.180
It is difficult to ensure that prosecutors have not manipulated the
baseline through precharge bargaining, but rigorous charge screen-
ing by a different prosecutor could help to ensure that charges start
at an appropriate level. Rationing cooperation agreements, restrict-
ing them to a distinct minority of overall cases, could also help limit
the corrosive mistrust they breed and assuage the fears that the
government is buying disloyalty or even engineering crimes.
CONCLUSION
Plea bargaining is a troubling way to dispense justice. Although
it purports to be an adjunct to the criminal justice system, the
Supreme Court rightly recognizes that bargaining has swallowed up
most of the system. We can no longer count on jury trials as back-
stops, ensuring that bargains are fair and accurate because bargains
are struck in the shadow of the adversarial process. To make it
fairer and more accurate, plea bargaining requires better infor-
mation, more participation, and a combination of inquisitorial and
more vigorous adversarial safeguards. Even without returning to a
world of jury trials, we could at least soften the worst aspects of our
concessionary system of bargained-for justice.
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